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TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD 
 
Norman Palmer )    Docket No.  2016-02-0026 
 ) 
v. )    State File No. 3024-2016 
 ) 
Paul Hardy, et al. ) 
 ) 
 ) 
Appeal from the Court of Workers’ ) 
Compensation Claims ) 
Brian K. Addington, Judge ) 
 
  
Affirmed and Remanded - Filed February 23, 2017 
 
 
In this interlocutory appeal, the employer challenges the trial court’s denial of its motion 
to dismiss the employee’s claim, asserting that, after denying benefits at an expedited 
hearing, it was error for the trial court to decline to dismiss the employee’s claim 
pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6).  Although the trial court 
considered matters outside the pleadings, it did not treat the motion as one for summary 
judgment as required by Rule 12.02(6).  The error, however, was harmless, and we affirm 
the trial court’s decision and remand the case for further proceedings as may be 
necessary. 
 
Judge David F. Hensley delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in which Presiding 
Judge Marshall L. Davidson, III, and Judge Timothy W. Conner joined. 
 
Joseph W. Ballard, Atlanta, Georgia, for the employer-appellant, Paul Hardy 
 
Norman Palmer, New Market, Tennessee, employee-appellee, pro se 
 
Factual and Procedural Background 
 
Norman Palmer (“Employee”) alleges suffering an epileptic seizure and falling 
from a roof upon which he was working while employed by Paul Hardy (“Employer”), 
resulting in head and low back injuries.  Employee has a history of seizures and advised 
Employer prior to being hired that he suffered from seizures.  In an expedited hearing 
addressing Employee’s request for temporary disability and medical benefits, he testified 
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that while installing flashing on a roof with a co-worker on October 21, 2015, he went to 
retrieve more flashing from the truck and remembered seeing the ladder that extended to 
the ground as he walked on the roof toward it.1  The next thing he remembered was his 
co-worker assisting him as he lay on the ground.  The ladder remained upright against the 
side of the house, and Employee had no memory of either falling from the roof or 
climbing down the ladder.  His face was bleeding and he felt pain around his back and 
groin areas.  The co-worker contacted Employer and was told to take Employee home as 
Employee had requested.  Five days later, Employee sought medical treatment for head 
pain and headaches at a hospital emergency department.  Upon his release from the 
emergency department he was advised to follow up with his primary care physician or a 
neurologist for a work release and evaluation.  However, Employee did not seek 
additional medical care until January 7, 2016, when he returned to the hospital 
emergency department complaining of low back pain.  
 
Soon thereafter, Employer denied the claim on the bases that there was “[n]o 
injury by accident in the course and scope of employment,” and that Employee “has 
epilepsy and had a seizure not caused by job.”  Following Employee’s filing of a petition 
for benefit determination, the filing of a dispute certification notice, and an expedited 
hearing, the trial court concluded Employee had not presented sufficient evidence to 
establish he was likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits as contemplated in Tennessee 
Code Annotated section 50-6-239(d)(1) (2016) and denied the requested benefits.  The 
trial court observed that the alleged fall was unwitnessed, that Employee was unable to 
provide any proof that he actually fell from the roof, and that he was some distance from 
the ladder when his co-worker found him.  Stating that Employee had not proven he fell 
from a height and that there are “any number of possible explanations as to how 
[Employee] came to be on the ground,” the trial court indicated that it “will not presume 
one.”  The trial court concluded that one reasonable inference from the evidence 
presented was that Employee suffered a seizure after descending the ladder and while on 
level ground.  It stated that a finding as to precisely how Employee came to be lying on 
the ground would be speculation and declined to “fill in the gaps of [Employee’s] 
testimony.” 
 
Following the issuance of the trial court’s order, Employer filed a motion to 
dismiss Employee’s claim based on Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-239(d)(4) 
and/or Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-02-21-.14(3) (2014).  Employer asserted in its 
                                                 
1 No transcript of the trial court proceedings was filed.  Although Section 3.4 of the Appeals Board’s 
Practices and Procedures requires that statements of the evidence be “joint,” Employer filed a unilateral 
“Statement of Evidence” that the trial court “[found] to be accurate and [approved].”  The record on 
appeal contains no information indicating Employee acquiesced in or objected to the “Statement of 
Evidence.”  Regardless, it is essentially a statement of the case identifying chronologically the documents 
filed in the trial court, the hearings conducted in the trial court, and the arguments advanced by Employer 
in the hearings.  Accordingly, we have gleaned the underlying facts from the trial court’s interlocutory 
orders, the technical record, and the exhibits offered into evidence at the expedited hearing.    
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motion that it was “forcing the Employee to address the evidentiary inadequacies that 
resulted in the adverse decision at the expedited hearing.”  It argued that “[u]nless 
Employee addresses the evidentiary inadequacies by either producing evidence that his 
injury arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of his employment, or 
articulates a clear intent and method to do so, this matter should be dismissed pursuant to 
the above-quoted rules.” 
 
 Both the statute and the regulation upon which Employer relies authorize an 
employer to file a motion to dismiss an employee’s claim in instances where a motion for 
temporary disability or medical benefits is denied on the basis that the claim is not 
compensable.  In its order denying Employer’s motion, the trial court explained that it did 
not deny Employee’s request for benefits “on grounds of compensability,” but 
“determined that [Employee] failed to come forward with sufficient evidence from which 
[it] could conclude he is likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits.”  The trial court 
found no basis to dismiss Employee’s claim pursuant to either the statute or the 
regulation, stating that its expedited hearing order “[did] not prevent [Employee] from 
developing his proof and ultimately prevailing either at trial or at a subsequent Expedited 
Hearing.” 
 
The trial court further concluded that Employer’s motion to dismiss was not 
presented as a motion for summary judgment “in accordance with Rule 56 of the 
Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure,” explaining that “[t]he only other potential basis for 
[Employer’s] Motion to Dismiss is Rule 12.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil 
Procedure,” and more specifically Rule 12.02(6), which provides for a dismissal for 
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”  Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6).  
Noting that Employee “asserted he fell from a rooftop while working for [Employer]” 
and that Employee “filed the appropriate documents within the Bureau and the Court to 
assert that claim,” the trial court concluded there was no basis to dismiss the case under 
Rule 12.02(6) and denied the motion.  Employer has appealed. 
 
                                           Standard of Review 
 
The standard we apply in reviewing a trial court’s decision is statutorily mandated 
and limited in scope.  Specifically, “[t]here shall be a presumption that the findings and 
conclusions of the workers’ compensation judge are correct, unless the preponderance of 
the evidence is otherwise.”  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7) (2015).  The trial court’s 
decision may be reversed or modified if the rights of a party “have been prejudiced 
because findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions of a workers’ compensation judge: 
 
(A) Violate constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(B) Exceed the statutory authority of the workers’ compensation judge; 
(C) Do not comply with lawful procedure; 
4 
 
(D) Are arbitrary, capricious, characterized by abuse of discretion, or 
clearly an unwarranted exercise of discretion; or 
(E) Are not supported by evidence that is both substantial and material 
in the light of the entire record.”  
 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-217(a)(3) (2015).  A trial court’s resolution of a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim is reviewed de novo with no presumption of 
correctness attached to the trial court’s conclusions.  Lourcey v. Estate of Scarlett, 146 
S.W.3d 48, 51 (Tenn. 2004). 
 
                                                    Analysis 
 
Employer asserts that the trial court erred “in finding that the Expedited Hearing 
Order was not based on compensability,” and in failing to require Employee to “come 
forward with some evidence to survive Employer’s Motion to Dismiss.”  We find 
Employer’s arguments to be unpersuasive. 
 
Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-239(d)(4) provides that if a motion for 
temporary disability or medical benefits is denied on the basis that the claim is not 
compensable, “the workers’ compensation judge may entertain an appropriate motion 
from the employer for dismissal of the claim.”  We have previously determined that a 
motion to dismiss a claim that relies on Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-
239(d)(4) or Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-02-21-.14(3) is not subject to “an alternate 
procedural or evidentiary rule . . . adopted by the administrator,” but is subject to the 
Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.  See Syph v. Choice Food Group, Inc., No. 2015-06-
0288, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 18 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Apr. 
21, 2016).2 
 
In its position statement on appeal, Employer cites a trial court order as purported 
authority for its assertion that “the trial court erred in finding that the Expedited Hearing 
Order was not based on compensability.”  However, trial court orders are not binding 
authority on appeal.  See Kimbrough v. Union Planters Corp., 1985 Tenn. App. LEXIS 
3049, at *18 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 1985) (Nearn, J., dissenting) (“[T]he decision of 
Trial Judges, Federal or State, are not binding precedent on this Court.  If they were, there 
would be no need of our existence.”), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Kimbrough v. 
Union Planters Nat’l Bank, 764 S.W.2d 203 (Tenn. 1989); Thomas v. Clinton, 607 F. 
App’x 903, 906 n.5 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[T]rial court decisions have no precedential 
                                                 
2 Employer filed its motion to dismiss on November 17, 2016.  Effective November 30, 2016, Tenn. 
Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-02-21-.14(3) was amended to provide that if the denial on the grounds of 
compensability is affirmed by the appeals board or if no appeal is taken, “the employer may file a motion 
for summary judgment . . . that meets the requirements of Rule 56 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil 
Procedure.”  The hearing on Employer’s motion to dismiss was held subsequent to the effective date of 
the amendment to the rule.    
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value.”); Grubbs v. Thermo Fisher Sci., No. 13-183-DLB-CJS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
56153, at *7 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 23, 2014) (“Trial court decisions can have an effect outside 
their originating case only under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.”).  
Moreover, the particular trial court order referenced by Employer, Jones v. Trojan Labor 
of Nashville, LLC, No. 2015-05-0427, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 67 (Tenn. Ct. 
Workers’ Comp. Claims Apr. 13, 2016), was vacated in light of Syph.  Accordingly, 
Employer’s reliance on Jones is misplaced. 
 
Rule 12.02(6) provides for the dismissal of a claim for “failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted.”  The Tennessee Supreme Court has explained that 
 
[a] Rule 12.02(6) motion challenges only the legal sufficiency of the 
complaint, not the strength of the plaintiff’s proof or evidence.  The 
resolution of a 12.02(6) motion to dismiss is determined by an examination 
of the pleadings alone.  A defendant who files a motion to dismiss admits 
the truth of all of the relevant and material allegations contained in the 
complaint, but . . . asserts that the allegations fail to establish a cause of 
action.  In considering a motion to dismiss, courts must construe the 
complaint liberally, presuming all factual allegations to be true and giving 
the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences.  A trial court should 
grant a motion to dismiss only when it appears that the plaintiff can prove 
no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to 
relief. 
 
Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422, 426 (Tenn. 2011) 
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The rule further provides that “[i]f  
. . . matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the 
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 
56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made 
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.”  Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6).   
 
Here, the petition for benefit determination had a significant defect in that the form 
as filed in the trial court was missing key information due to a technical problem 
apparently caused by Employee’s typing beyond the printable lines on the form itself.  
For example, the section of the form asking for a description of the injury states, “I was 
on the roof at the jobsite and went toward the ladder to g[. . . .]”  The text abruptly stops 
at the end of the line on the form instead of continuing on the blank line below it.  The 
record gives no indication why this defect in the petition was not discovered and 
addressed, and it is significant because a petition for benefit determination is the Bureau 
of Workers’ Compensation’s general equivalent of a complaint.  See Valladares v. 
Transco Products, Inc., Nos. 2015-01-0117 & 2015-01-0118, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. 
Bd. LEXIS 31, at *17 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. July 27, 2016).  It necessarily 
follows that the trial court considered information in the record outside of the information 
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in the petition as the court concluded that Employee “asserted he fell from a rooftop 
while working for [Employer]” and that Employee “filed the appropriate documentation 
with the Bureau and the Court to assert that claim.”3   
 
 Having considered matters that were outside the pleadings, the trial court was 
required to treat Employer’s motion as one for summary judgment in accordance with 
Rule 56, but failed to do so.  The error was harmless, however, because Employer’s 
motion did not comply with Rule 56, which requires, among other things, that such 
motions “shall be accompanied by a separate concise statement of the material facts as to 
which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue for trial.”  We also note that, 
although matters outside the pleadings were considered by the trial court, there is no 
indication in the record that the parties were given an “opportunity to present all material 
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56” as Rule 12.02(6) requires.  However, 
Employer has made no argument on appeal raising that issue and, therefore, we decline to 
address it. 
 
                                                            Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court, having considered matters 
outside the pleadings, should have treated Employer’s motion to dismiss as one for 
summary judgment.  The error, however, was harmless because the motion did not 
comply with Rule 56.  Accordingly, the trial court’s decision is affirmed and the case is 
remanded for any further proceedings that may be necessary. 
                                                 
3 As noted, the trial court previously held an expedited hearing and heard and considered the testimony of 
Employee and considered four exhibits that were admitted into evidence, including the affidavit of 
Employee and the medical records concerning the care Employee received during two visits to the 
hospital emergency room.  Employee’s affidavit alleged he was “going toward the ladder to get more step 
flashing from the truck and woke up on the ground.”  It alleged Employee “never went down the ladder to 
the ground,” but “fell off the roof during [his] seizure.”  Consistent with Employee’s allegations, the 
medical records in evidence state that Employee “was on the roof at work when he fell while having a 
seizure.” 
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